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James Rachels:
The Moral Implications of Evolution
In Created From Animals,
James Rachels cogently argues that scientific knowledge, in particular the
evolution of species, dissolves many of the assumptions which form the foundation
of traditional morality. The notion that, by virtue of being human, one is
entitled to special moral treatment, is no longer tenable in light of our
scientific understanding of the world around us.
Before scientific enlightenment,
it was thought that Earth was the centerpiece of the Universe. Humans were
supposedly created by God in his likeness. Animals, created by God as fundamentally
lesser beings, were under human dominion. Given this view of the world, humans
were set apart from animals and had a special God-given moral standing. In
general, the moral framework of the time was consistent with our understanding
(or lack of understanding) of the world.
Our
knowledge of the evolution of species, and earlier of basic astronomy, has
eliminated many of the assumptions from which traditional morality could follow.
Science has revealed that Earth does not have a special place in the Universe,
and humans and other animals are evolutionary products of the same nature.
In The Origin of Species, Darwin himself stated that the boundaries
we define between species are largely arbitrary and for convenience. Given
this continuity of species, it cannot logically follow that only humans have
categorical moral worth. Nevertheless, deeply-engrained moral views, even
if no longer consistent with our own knowledge of the world, should not be
expected to immediately collapse. In general, philosophers have been slow
to assimilate scientific knowledge and to explore its consequences, and lay
people often hold onto the comfortable moral views they have known since childhood,
and which have been passed on from generation to generation. Only relatively
recently have the human-to-nonhuman moral implications of Darwin's work been
seriously considered.
Critics of extending
morality to other sentient beings often state that the quality which really
sets humans apart from other animals is the ability to reason. The notion
that only humans can reason contradicts both Darwin's observations (The
Descent of Man) and our current knowledge concerning many other species.
It is true that only humans engage in philosophical discussions and mathematics,
but this ability to reason is a difference in degree, not in kind. Furthermore,
Rachels makes a strong case that the ability to reason is not usually
relevant to moral consideration.
Given that humans
and other animals are products of evolution, as opposed to immutable creations
with unique essences, Rachels supports the idea that moral consideration
should be a systematic, rather than a dogmatic, process. Insofar as animals
are similar to humans, they should be treated similarly; insofar as they
are different, they may be treated differently. For example, both rabbits
and humans are sensitive to physical stress, and both species seek to
avoid suffering. On the other hand, humans have far greater intellectual
abilities. But both, only one, or neither of these qualities might be
relevant to a given situation or treatment. Consider the common Draize
test, in which the safety of new chemicals is evaluated by dripping them
into the eyes of restrained rabbits. Such treatment of humans is not morally
acceptable, nor should it be of rabbits since they too are very sensitive
to such external physical stress. The lack of a rabbit's intellectual
abilities are morally irrelevant to the situation since his physical suffering
is not associated with intellect. On the other hand, a rabbit's lack of
intellect precludes him from having an interest in--say--language. To
deny him any exposure to language cannot be deemed immoral, though such
treatment in the case of a human would be. The shared sensitivity of humans
and rabbits to external physical stress is morally irrelevant to the exposure
to language, just as intellect is irrelevant to physical [mis]treatment.
In fact, we treat animals in many ways in which it would be deemed immoral
to treat humans, but such treatment cannot be justified in the absence
of a relevant difference. The principle of treating like cases
alike is essential to a consistent moral code; without it, justice is
simply not possible.
Rachels points out that
humanity is still within the process of exploring the moral implications
of being akin to the animals. If we are to act reasonably and ethically,
it is inevitable that we adopt a moral code which is once again consistent
with our understanding of the world and our place within it.
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